

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

IN PAPUA

PAPUA CONGRES II

29 MAY-4 JUNE 2000

and

THE SITUATION PASCA-CONGRESS

oleh

SEKRETARIAT KEADILAN & PERDAMAIAN

KEUSKUPAN JAYAPURA

**JAYAPURA
January 2001**

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"PAPUA : PASCA-CONGRESS"

KATA PENGANTAR

In this short report we try to analyse the main developments in Papua over the second half of 2000. Very little attention will be given to developments elsewhere in the Indonesian Republic, although we are aware these developments have a heavy impact on the way the "Papua-problem" is looked at and is handled by the central government and the security forces.

This analysis is the fourth in a series and assumes that developments dwelt on in previous 'socio-political notes' are sufficiently known.

Towards the Congress

The period that had been set for preparation of the Papua Congress II was relatively short, extending only from March to end of May. During this preparation period two 'almost' contradictory lines of action/policy became clear, directly concerning the relation between "the authorities" and "the independence movement":

1. The security is keeping key-persons in the Papua Movement busy with interrogations and accusations (of subversion).
2. The central government (especially the President) has shown a keen interest in keeping in touch with the key-persons in the Papua Movement by frequently inviting them over to Jakarta for discussion.

In the public statements the leading persons in the movement express themselves in terms of: *moving to a new, just and peaceful Papua* and have increasingly left out the polarising language/rethoric of: *moving to an independent Papua*. Also in a number of private writings by 'opinion leaders'¹ the preference to talk about a "*New Papua*" is becoming a rather common bottom line. It is reflected also in the 'sub-theme' of the Congress: "Rakyat Papua bertekad menegakkan demokrasi dan hak-hak azasi manusia berdasarkan prinsip kebenaran dan Keadilan menuju Papua Baru". (The Papua People is determined to establish democracy and respect for basic human rights based on the principle of truth and justice moving towards a New Papua).

¹ Cfr. the book by Dr. Benny Giyai, published just before the Congress, "Menuju Papua Baru" (Towards A New Papua), Jayapura, May 2000.

Given the facts, a number of opinion leaders are more and more open to a long process. This realism is understood and accepted within only a limited circle of people. Dialogue with authorities might be interpreted as a public sign of this first step to rationalisation. Recent efforts to socialise the movement to a wider circle (grassroot communities) is another signal, although this socialisation hasn't proved very successful so far. Internal reflection within in the main protestant church (GKI), -three successive workshops in Sentani, Biak and Sorong, gathering all the pastors in the province- is another constructive effort to cope with the developments.

The up coming Congress is more and more talked about as a "normal way to discuss the existing aspirations", and cautiously accepted by the authorities (including financial support by the President). The final organisation of the Congress takes place in a strikingly quiet atmosphere, while -as stated above- disturbed by interrogations.

It looked like Papua was moving to a new highlight, but still very questionable whether it might meet the expectations, as clear targets are not yet set publicly, and as expectations might still show a wide variety.

The Congress is on

Once the Congress is in full swing the rather dominating expectation among the participants is to 'get things over with now'. This means that the 'group which is very vocal' and dominating the atmosphere at the Congress demands straight independence and doesn't refrain itself from expressing it very emotionally without any 'careful calculation'.

During the opening there was an extraordinary mix of "respect on one hand" and "blunt aggressive talk on the other". The Local Government -in full strength present at the opening as well as at the closure ceremony- was thanked for its presence, and at the same time blamed for everything that is wrong; the national anthem was sung by a special choir, while followed by the Papuan hymn in which everybody joined in; the President was thanked for his contribution (a.o. a financial support of 1 milliard rupiah) and at the same time blamed for his absence; happiness was expressed over the presence of Non-Papuan Indonesians as observers and at the same time the Indonesian people were valued as a 'devil's people'.

On the second day of the Congress the governor from the neighbouring province of Sandaun (PNG) was given a chance to talk (before leaving again after a presence of just a couple of hours). Although claiming that he was speaking as a private person, there is little doubt he was regarded as a government-representative. He strongly backed up the independence movement and got a more than proportional reception. This easily can be used by the Indonesian authorities 'to counter-act' as international relations are involved (and according to the Indonesian authorities: damaged).

While settling for the internal terms of procedures of the Congress -such as its authority, the composition of people with the right to vote, etc.- there was a real power struggle, which was dominated by the more radical factions. This part of the meeting proved as well that a very crowded meeting is not easy managed, if at all. As to this aspect the chair-people did a terrific job.

The preparation of the meeting was very well done with regard to external matters (admittance to meeting hall and such), and taken care of by hundreds of stern looking Satgas. As to internal matters the preparation looked rather weak and poorly coordinated, and lacking the element of an united performance by the Presidium. There was no formulated concept that could be offered to the participants to be discussed. This might have been the weakest link in handling developments during the Congress, while giving room for the most vocal group 'to win' without real progress in developing a concept, a strategy or policy-line.

Given this situation it must be highlighted that the organising committee succeeded in concluding the Congress with a relative moderate statement, which left room for the people's aspirations and at the same time opted for a peacefull way, marked by dialogue on the national as well international level². The end resolution also gave the Presidium a rather open and little articulated mandate to handle the aspirations and to report on the results by December 1, 2000.

The Congress ended as it has started as a joyfull manifestation attended by thousands of people, closely watched by security-forces who refrained from interference. The demands that had been initially formulated during the gathering in February (MUBES) were repeated, an additional step had been set to organise the movement by giving a mandate to the Presidium, while the end resolution stresses more than ever before the need for a **rectification of history**, pointing to historical events in 1961, 1962 and 1969.

Aftermath of the Congress

Listening to the reaction on the Congress, especially the opinions voiced in Jakarta, it was evident that the Congress has triggered a very negative response among leading political figures in the central government and in the circle of security forces. Almost unanimously the results of the Congress were rejected (impression: even before the final resolution was made public!) and the movement in Papua was more and more talked about as a separatist movement, hence illegal. The reactions can be read as a first signal of an important change of attitude in the power centers. Where political figures were still rather mild and tolerant (even once in a while sympathetic) in their reactions over the period before the Congress, the tune changed radically after the Congress and voices to stop the movement, if needed by using force, began to be heard frequently.

This change in attitude is hardly understandable if based solely on new

² Full texte of the concluding statement in annex 1.

developments in Papua itself, as there wasn't a radical change there. They might be understood as a reflection of an internal power struggle in the central government circle itself, which cleverly used the event in Papua as a handy 'political commodity'. Too often the people who characterised the movement in Papua as "subversive" connected the movement straight away with the support given by the President, hence partly blaming him for the developing of a separatist movement. This negative stand taken by a number of civil political leaders was joined by people in the circle of security forces, together making up a quite strong political block. In line with this development the President himself was purposely cut off from an easy going and regular contact with the core leaders of the Papua Movement.

In brief, a new tune has been set, and was translated in stern political statements and measures over the months that followed. Following are just some elements connected with this change of attitude and developments within the power centre:

- ❖ The Papua Movement almost exclusively labelled as separatist only, and hardly a sign of any objective understanding of the real background of the movement.
- ❖ Potential understanding of the problems became increasingly hindered by the socialisation of misleading ideologies, such as: "problems in Papua are the results of an international conspiracy" and "problems in Papua are just a matter of conflict between Christians and Muslims".
- ❖ The MPR refusing to endorse the change of the name of the province into Papua –a name already popularly used for months.
- ❖ Increasing demands to lower the Papua Flag, although officially and conditionally allowed by the President himself in the months before.
- ❖ Deployment of additional troops in Papua.
- ❖ The political room for the President to move becoming substantially restricted in favour of more room to move for the Vice-President and her supporters.

Other developments

Some of the Presidium members travelled to parts of Papua to socialise the results of the Congress. Besides passing on some information the socialisation gatherings proved to be mainly a local manifestation of support and expression of expectations. As another part of executing the mandate given by the Congress, the Papua Presidium began travelling while lobbying on the national and international level. On the national level the Presidium tried to inform the main political actors in Jakarta. Constructive results of that lobbying didn't show really in the measures as mentioned above. The results of the lobby activity on international level are hard to judge. Some indications can be mentioned, such as:

- ❖ Increasing sympathy in the Pacific; two countries, Vanuatu and Nauru, have picked up the issue explicitly while supporting the demands of the Papua Movement to get its rights recognised and dealt with properly.
- ❖ The South Pacific Forum, gathering at Kiribati (Oct. 2000), was attended by some Papuan delegates, where they received unofficial recognition. The Forum concluded with a resolution to explore ways in which to act quickly in the event of future conflicts in the region (in this context Fiji, Solomon Islands, Bougainville were meant, but Papua was clearly also included by implication). The Forum urged the Indonesian government to recognise the basic human rights of all citizens and refrain from using violence in resolving the current conflict.
- ❖ Some initial pressure has been put on the UN via interventions by aforementioned Pacific countries and by a marginal presence of Presidium members during the UN session in October 2000.
- ❖ In some countries interest has been created in re-studying the events of 1961, 1962 and 1969. An official government-supported research on the Act of Free Choice (1969) is under way in the Netherlands.
- ❖ Countries like the USA, Australia and The Netherlands have made clear public statements of not supporting any disintegration of the Indonesian Republic.
- ❖ The Papua Movement has gained more public attention all over the world.
- ❖ Locally the Papua Community began voicing some scepticism as to the intensive international travel scheme; with people asking themselves what was the Presidium really doing?

Impact on the local community

Travelling through some parts of Papua during the months after the Congress, it was a strong impression that the local community didn't get the real picture of the situation and still nursed very high expectations which often were expressed briefly by statements such as: 'we will be independent by December 1, 2000'. This seems to confirm that the socialisation activity following the Congress was very (if too) limited, and once again the people only picked up bits of information about a very successful happening (the Congress), while actually they were left behind, guessing what was really happening and what was to happen next. Too few efforts were made to correct these high expectations.

While issues increased in number about possible infiltration by 'provocateurs' from the Moluccas, about the smuggling in of weapons, about the building up of 'militias', the security forces began to show its force and intention, by building up a striking increase of personel deployed in Papua. Although initially explained by security authorities as a 'normal replacement/refreshment of troops', later it was officially admitted that more security personel (figures are often only to be guessed³) were and will be placed in Papua "to guarantee the people's security".

Developments after the MPR session

Observing developments over the last six months, it looks like the MPR-session in August 2000 marks a political turning point. During the MPR-session the "Papua-issue" wasn't really treated with any understanding, but rather regarded as a very disturbing local movement which should be stopped with all means. The increasing deployment of troops started straight after the session was over. This intensified military/police presence has been accompanied by clear fields of action, concerning respectively: (1) the Papua Flag, and (2) the Satgas annex Posko and (3) the Presidium. It proved to be the beginning of some tragic and bloody clashes.

THE PAPUA FLAG

In line with the attitude showed by MPR-members, the legality of raising the Papua Flag became a very hot issue of discussion. For half a year the flag was raised freely, although never completely allowed officially (cfr. the forced lowering of the flag in Timika and Nabire); nevertheless it was conditionally tolerated (flown lower than the Indonesian flag, and slightly smaller in size). Besides that the flag was freely used for decorations and was popular on T-shirts and caps. People became accustomed to seeing their flag honoured.

Amidst that setting a confusing discussion started in the central government circle about the meaning of the flag: is it a politically motivated expression, or simply an expression of a specific cultural identity? Not surprising that people in power decided that it was a clear political expression and therefore not allowed, alias illegal. Based on that 'verdict' on September 23, 2000 an instruction was delivered by the head of the national police force (during his inauguration ceremony) ordering to lower the flag all over the province. This triggered heavy disappointment and anger in the Papua Community. During last minute discussions (October 3, 2000) with the local government, including the head of the regional police, a compromise was reached: it was agreed that the flag was allowed to fly over Papua until the Presidium had had a chance to meet with the President (scheduled for October 19, 2000) to

³ A specified list has been published in the weekly Tifa Papua, Th. 44, No. 30, 21-25 Agustus 2000, pag. 5; TNI increased its personel with 1184, POLRI increased its personel with 1700, covering Timika (TNI 651; Polri 250), Merauke TNI 323; Polri 320), Biak (Polri 250), Fakfak (TNI 65; Polri 100), Sorong (TNI 42; Polri 200), Manokwari (Polri 250), Nabire (Polri 150), Wamena (Polri 150) and Serui (TNI 103; Polri 30).

discuss the matter directly. Nevertheless three days after the agreement was reached in Jayapura the police in the Jayawijaya region started forcing the lowering of the flag, leading to heavy bloodshed and a fear-dominated local community (affecting Papuans as well as Non-Papuans); thirty seven people got killed, scores were injured, tens of people were detained by the police and mistreated while in custody, and scores of people fled the region. The most cynical element in this particular event was that the local police chief made clear that his action was ordered by the head of the regional police, who three days before had concluded the agreement with the Presidium members and other regional government officials.

Besides lowering the flag, it became clear that the action by security forces was meant as well to execute another part of the (hidden) agenda: a straight crack down on any form of popular organisation like the Satgas, the Posko or the Panel (local representatives of the Dewan Papua) .

In an effort to stop the violence the Presidium discussed the new situation on October 7, 2000. The meeting decided to address a request to the President of the Indonesian Republic with the following items⁴:

- ❖ To organise a meeting with the central security authorities while involving the Presidium and the Provincial Government to discuss matters relating to the Papua Flag and the province-name Papua.
- ❖ A request to the President to proclaim Papua as a “Peace Zone”.
- ❖ To urge all parties in the central government to respect and maintain the law.
- ❖ To explain honestly and publicly why scores of troops have been deployed in Papua.
- ❖ To ensure social and political protection and security.

Besides addressing the President, the Presidium decided to send a delegation to Wamena to engage in dialogue with the local community and the local security forces.

⁴ See Statement by the Presidium of the Papua Council, No. A-01-190/PDP/B-IX.2000 de dato October 7, 2000.

SATGAS-POSKO-PANEL

Already since the instruction by the regional head of the police way back in 1999 (Maklumat Kapolda de dato April 17, 1999) the dismantling of the Posko and Satgas had become a clear target. This is proved by major showdowns in Sorong (July 1999), Nabire (March 2000) and Fakfak (March 2000), while minor incidents took place everywhere over this period of time. Once again the picture is very confusing, while as recently as August 18, 2000 the Satgas was allowed to have an own 'workshop' in Jayapura, which was attended and supported by representatives of security forces as well as of the regional government. The event gave the Satgas its own organisational structure and gained them official recognition. Therefore it is hardly understandable that this organisation became the main target in operations a little more than a month later.

At the same time the presence of the Satgas had been used by certain elements in the armed forces to build up a kind of counter-organisation, using local Papuan groups –including OPM-groups- which could be easily motivated (as they felt excluded from the new movement) to oppose the movement led by the Presidium. This hidden building up of a counter-force already caused physical clashes in Fakfak (March 2000) and Bade (September 2000). Once in a while it had been suggested by "Papua Movement-friendly" sides to dismantle the Satgas on its own initiative as it might be used by less friendly sides to legitimise a crackdown on the Papua Movement in all its aspects. Over the last six months that is exactly what has been happening. It happened in Nabire just after the MUBES (March), in Wamena (October), in Merauke on two occasions (November and December), it happened in Jayapura (December) and it was made clear for everybody via a public statement by the security authorities ordering police/army to catch any member of the OPM/TPN -elements which are easily 'confused' with Satgas as well (Cenderawasih Pos de dato January 5, 2001).

As open and transparent investigations into the recent events in Wamena, Merauke and Jayapura never have taken place (or have been clearly hindered from taking place), there are still a lot of open questions as to why and exactly how it happened, who were the main actors, and who were leading the events on the spot or behind the scenes? Wamena was even closed to the public during more than a week, although assistance (especially humanitarian/medical aid) was urgently needed. Why? Nevertheless a number of effects of the events have become clear⁵:

- ❖ A considerable number of people got killed, and a great deal of psychological and material damage was done.
- ❖ The education activities stopped completely and have not yet been substantially restored (especially outside the Grand Valley), leaving thousands of children without proper education. A lot of other social and economical activities ceased as well, or continued on a very limited scale.

⁵ To get the full picture, see: "Peristiwa Tragedi Kemanusiaan Wamena 6 Oktober 2000", a report by a special investigation team under coordination of SKP Keuskupan Jayapura. Report made public on January 27, 2001.

- ❖ Scores of people left the places out of fear for security personnel; many people have been picked up and beaten up in acts of flagrant disregard for basic legal and human rights; hence people have lost any trust in the authorities and prefer to look for safer places (for the time being, at least).
- ❖ Scores of people left the main hotspots (and even Papua) because they were frightened by the recent developments.
- ❖ The people from the Highlands (especially the Jayawijaya-Highlands) became stigmatised by security authorities as the main trouble-making people, hence were assumed to be the main actors in the Abepura incident of December 7, 2000. This discriminatory stigmatisation was enough to effect arrest of persons in the absence of any human or legal consideration.
- ❖ The events have legitimated suggestions to the Non-Papuan segments of the society to arm themselves in order to be able to defend themselves, while local Papuan people who are traditionally used to carrying 'sharp tools' with them, have become a target for searches of those "carrying weapons".
- ❖ The Wamena event in particular has been often presented as a conflict between Papuans and Non-Papuans, a picture which is not correct. This kind of explanation and presentation easily leads to horizontal conflicts. A local organisation has been set up, naming itself: "Solidarity Movement Of The Indonesian Non-Papua Community".
- ❖ The recent events tend to be used to legitimise increased police- and army-presence (and action) on one hand, and to discredit the Papua Movement in general on the other.

PAPUA LEADERS CHARGED AND TAKEN INTO CUSTODY

Leading up to the December 1, 2000 celebration four core leaders of the Papua Movement have been called in for interrogation and held in custody pending further processing. They have been charged with 'subversion'. The charges relate to events way back in November 1999, December 1999, February 2000 (Mubes), and May-June 2000 (Congres). Included in the group is Don Flassy who in the beginning of the year 2000 was officially and unconditionally cleared by the court of involvement in subversive action. Why have these people been taken in? is an often heard question and still needs to be answered.

The arrests took place in the wake of December 1, 2000. This date refers to a lot of important elements: (1) the anniversary of the start of the independence-oriented process set in movement by the Dutch government in 1961, (2) the anniversary of the first public flagraising in 1999 allowed under Indonesian rule, (3) the day that the Presidium was meant to report on its work after being given a mandate by the Papua Congress II in May-June, and (4) the day a lot of people in the Papua Community expected that freedom/independence would be declared/ given.

Moving towards December 1, 2000 the situation in and around Jayapura became tense: what could be expected? What would be the reaction by people who might see their high expectations unfulfilled? What could be expected from the Presidium reporting on their work over the last months?

Many people became nervous and voices were heard suggesting that the people be prepared to take refuge somewhere else (especially in PNG). A "Committee for Independence" emerged by mid-November; from where? Its origin wasn't that clear, but it started voicing its doubts about the Presidium and requesting people to be ready for action if the hoped-for independence would not materialise. The Presidium engaged in dialogue with the authorities and reached an agreement (9 November) stipulating: (1) the political problems and security related to the position of the Presidium and its role will be a matter of attention of the regional government together with the Presidium; (2) the Papuan Flag –still flown in 5 districts, Jayapura, Yapen Waropen, Merauke, Puncak Jaya and Manokwari- will be allowed to be flown only at the private home of the head of the traditional council in the aforementioned five districts, starting December 1, 2000, while it will be completely forbidden to be raised in any of the other 9 districts; (3) starting on December 2, 2000 the headquarters of the Satgas and the flag raised at the Papuan Cultural Centre in Jayapura will be moved to the house of the head of the traditional council (LMA Papua). The agreement sparked off quite some discussion but was followed by Satgas and Presidium circles in the respective districts. Nevertheless quite critical notes were heard as well and the appearance of the aforementioned Committee for Independence might be related to a refusal of the contents of this agreement.

The security forces began to show of force in and around Jayapura, displaying their readiness, while fighter-planes circled the highlands, and helicopters parachuted fresh troops in the Baliem Valley (at Aikame, Pikhe on November 23, 2000).

In the end the 1st December celebration took place in a tense but rather quiet situation, while troops camped outside the main history-loaded "Papua Building" in Jayapura and just in front of the central Satgas Centre in Sorong. The papua Flag was lowered in a rather quiet ceremony and a day later the Satgas has been moved from their headquarters. Also elsewhere in the province the situation looked quiet and 'under control'. Troubles started later. The two most important ones: Merauke on the 2nd of December, Jayapura on the 7th of December, while a group of people fled Papua for PNG and gathered at the border-area. Both mentioned incidents (Merauke and Jayapura) were followed by disproportional repression by the security forces.

Especially the aftermath of the last two incidents, combined with the fresh memory of what happened in Wamena in October, left the papua Community in a kind of powerless condition, silently witnessing and suffering. A new building up of bitter experiences, which will be stored for the future. The main leaders in jail, and other members of the Presidium threatened with the same fate; protests by human rights organisations and Churches not being honoured by the security authorities. So, the end of the year 2000 was mainly marked by fear and disappointment, while not clear what might be expected in the year to come. The visit by the President (on Christmas) couldn't lift this heavy burden. Summarising the situation at the end of the year it might be stated:

- ❖ Recent events have resulted in fear and anger all over the province combined with the experience of powerlessness. A very dominant presence by the security forces has taken the place of a freely moving and speaking up Papua Community. Positive expectations of having their aspirations listened to have gone. People don't know anymore what to expect.
- ❖ It is difficult to see whether there is still room for a democratisation process, so enthusiastically started throughout the entire Republic two years ago. Is this the end of a promising spring of democracy? Will any critical note in the future be easily understood and treated as "illegal" or "subversive"? The questions are for real.
- ❖ The leading position of the Presidium of the Papua Council has been broken down and the price to be paid for the activities by the Presidium over the last year has still to be guessed. Politically loaded court-procedures will be under way soon in Jayapura, Wamena and Merauke.
- ❖ Human Rights Organisations feel their room to speak up has been endangered, while Churches still try to keep the dialogue and peace-oriented movement open. Some help is expected by newly announced activities by the national Commission for Human Rights, which is intending to start an investigation into what has happened in Abepura and afterwards.
- ❖ The civil government proves to have very little say in security matters, and gears its full attention to stipulating the contents of a far-reaching autonomy as the only practical answer to the people's aspirations. Gaining support by the Papua Community while socialising that concept (probably the only alternative way), will be very difficult as the credibility of the authorities in general has broken down over the last months.
- ❖ It would not be surprising when the local community will start to show signs of apathy and resignation, as they don't see anymore how to get their real problems understood and their hopes addressed.

For sure the picture at the end of the year is not bright, to say the least. Still it is hoped by wide circles of the Papua Community that new strength might be found to continue a peaceful and open way of getting human dignity respected and restored.

Theo van den Broek ofm

Director SKP/Office for Justice & Peace, Jayapura

No.: 121/TB/99/7.9.

Re.: **Tuntutan-tuntutan 1 Desember 1999**

Ref: Cepos tgl. 2 Des. 1999

Below I list the demands as have been expressed at ceremonies of flag-raising at Sentani and Jayapura on December 1, 1999

- 1̃ we demand the continuation/follow-up of the dialogue which has been initiated at the presidential palace on February 26, 1999
- 2̃ we demand that all political prisoners from origine Papuan will be released without any condition, and also the canceling of any travel-ban or travel-restriction for whatsoever reason inflicted on Papuan leaders in the country.
- 3̃ we demand that the Counsel of Representatives on provincial level as well as on district level organize a special session in order to discuss the aspirations of the Papua People.
- 4̃ we demand that the right for selfdetermination will be recognised and that independence will be granted to the Papua People as realized on December 1, 1961; this should be done in West Papua in the presence of the President of the Indonesian Republic as well as the Chairman of the DPR (House of Representatives National level) and the chairman of MPR (Highest House of Representatives in the country).
- 5̃ we demand the retirement of the army from West Papua without any condition, and under supervision by the international world.
- 6̃ we demand that the wording "tribe Irian" be replaced by the wording "Papua People".
- 7̃ we demand that the name "Irian Jaya" be replaced by the name "West Papua", and the name "Jayapura" be replaced by the name "Port Numbay".

I have translated these seven demands based on the information the daily Cenderewasih Pos, d.d. December 2, 1999, page 4.

Theo van den Broek

Director Office for Justice & Peace